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"A history of moralism," the late intellectual historian Henry May once
observed, "would come close to being a history of American thought."' It was a
forgivable exaggeration, for his point still stands when it comes to the
exceptionalist American self-understanding that May's comment as much enacted
as described. From the beginning, Americans have often been prone not simply to
assume an uncomplicated belief in what May called "the first and central article of
faith in the national credo . .. : the reality, certainty, and eternity of moral values." 2
They have also overwhelmingly tended to infer that, as "perhaps the most often
stated corollary of all, the United States, as a special leader in moral progress, had
a special responsibility for moral judgment . . . ."
This fact helps explain why, during the era in which their straightforward
allegiances to these longstanding truths remained uncontested, Americans signed
on with uncommon alacrity and enthusiasm to the mission of European
international law to provide moral reform of the world. Improvement in the name
of America's special insight into the ethical realities of the universe could not, to
be sure, remain restricted to the nation's own borders. One might have predicted
that the country's self-image would not survive the stress of its evolution from
self-appointed exemplar for the world to tentative engagement in the world. Yet, in
the initial age of American empire, no serious disturbance followed. For that
matter, how fundamentally did America's self-image ever change under pressure?
This question is what seems to be most at stake when reckoning with the powerful
* James Bryce Professor of European Legal History, Department of History, Columbia
University.
1. HENRY F. MAY, THE END OF AMERICAN INNOCENCE: A STUDY OF THE FIRST YEARS OF
OUR OWN TIME 1912-1917, at 10 (1959).
2. Id. at 9-10.
3. Id.
4. See BENJAMIN COATES, TRANSATLANTIC ADVOCATES: AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1898-1919, at 67 (2010) (discussing how Americans
maintained a lively discussion with European correspondents, shared similar international legal
reform advocacy, and how the exchange shaped how Americans conceived of their own national
identity and global role).
5. See IAN R. TYRRELL, REFORMING THE WORLD: THE CREATION OF AMERICA'S MORAL
EMPIRE 74 (2010) (summarizing that America's initial expansions were marked by the shift of
Christian temperance groups, evolving from domestic groups to international organizations).
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story told in the last chapter of Martti Koskenniemi's classic masterpiece, The
Gentle Civilizer ofNations.
At the opposite pole from American nationalists, German nationalists had
always been in the lead in viewing morality as a likely mask for self-interest. The
insight was not unique to the Germans; from St. Augustine on, the most self-aware
moralists have known that there was no sin more potentially appalling-or at least
hypocritical-than that of the moralist's prideful righteousness itself. Yet it was
reserved for Germans, with their Lutheran consciousness of the lurking
omnipresence of sin informing their vision of global order, to argue that open
pursuit and defense of national self-interest-including in and through
international law-might be the best starting point. At least, all things considered,
it was preferable to the laughable fiction that individual states in a persistently
violent order obey moral principle and pursue humanity's good. It was not, the
Germans insisted (at least sometimes), that they hated morality. Rather, they had
learned how duplicitous moral claims were from their hard experiences beset by
enemies. Americans, by contrast, were protected by distance and water from foes
who claimed to visit morality on them, and so they could subsist on illusions bred
of their own self-regard.7 Especially after World War I cast them as aggressive
enemies of high-minded states to the West, Germans offered the disturbing
wisdom that "whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat."8
Koskenniemi cites this famous tagline from Carl Schmitt as a section title in
his chapter.9 Along with a few others, Koskenniemi helped establish Schmitt's
centrality to any account of twentieth century intellectual history-or indeed any
attempt to establish the credentials of a universalistic international law today.
"[T]he choice between writing another 1,000-page textbook on humanitarian law
and trying to deal with Schmitt's critiques of universal moralism," Koskenniemi
mordantly put it, "should not be too difficult."' 0 But Koskenniemi went on to
pursue the surprising claim that, in spite of their moralistic adolescence, Americans
themselves went Schmittian after World War II, as their once fitful imperialism
6. See MARTrI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 ch. 6 (2002) [hereinafter KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE
CIVILIZER OF NATIONS].
7. Friedrich Meinecke, to take only one example, knew that the relationship between
universal justice and state power, the latter rooted ultimately in animal imperatives starting with
basic survival but including the lust for domination, was far from obvious. See FRIEDRICH
MEINECKE, MACHIAVELLISM: THE DOCTRINE OF RAISON D'ETAT AND ITS PLACE IN MODERN
HISTORY, at xxvii (Douglas Scott trans., 1957) ("Even at the end of his life he called 'universal
history' an 'enigmatic texture of necessity and freedom'."). He tacked back and forth about how
to reconcile them through his long career, but throughout, he thought, the least plausible response
was to believe that raison d'dtat was an optional extra-as if morality alone sufficed, especially
when offered as the rationale for the acts of great power. See generally Samuel Moyn, The First
Historian ofHuman Rights, 116 AM. HIST. REV. 58, 58-79 (Feb. 2011).
8. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 54 (George Schwab et al. trans.,
expanded ed. 2007).
9. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 432.
10. Id. at 424.
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became unquestionable hegemony."
Conquering German armies, Americans allowed themselves to be conquered
in turn by the insight of their erstwhile enemies. Far from adhering to the
international lawyer's faith in formalism as the key to the progressive moralization
of the world, Americans followed imported German sage Hans Morgenthau in
turning to the rival and deformalizing science of "international relations." 2 Like
Schmitt, they learned to treat the national interest as the main factor in world order,
doubting the applicability of transcendent morality or international law, except as
smiling rationalizations of self-interest after the fact. In this way, Koskenniemi
makes his own the thesis of Leo Strauss, who observed that sudden post-World
War II doubts about the eternity and certainty of morality did not mark "the first
time that a nation, defeated on the battlefield and, as it were, annihilated as a
political being, has deprived its conquerors of the most sublime fruit of victory by
imposing on them the yoke of its own thought." 3
Koskenniemi's story about Schmitt's baleful legacy has been broadly
influential-earning various extensions and inviting various reservations.14
Koskenniemi's thesis with respect to the evolution of the discipline of international
law has been less resonant and less examined, with the persisting room for
formalism that the field retained.' 5 After all, Koskenniemi's case about
Morgenthau, that apostate to the field of international law, is only part of his last
chapter, which frames that story with a larger one about the trajectory of those who
remained within the fold. And while I am in broad agreement with Koskenniemi's
11. See id. at 482 (discussing that after World War II, the Americans largely gave up pre-
war "utopian" hopes and marginalized law from the center of political decision-making).
12. See id. at 437 (stating that the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union
led to the end of the old state system based on the balance of power between formally sovereign,
European, nations).
13. LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 2 (1953).
14. See, e.g., THE INVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: REALISM, THE
ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION, AND THE 1954 CONFERENCE ON THEORY 215 (Nicholas Guilbot
ed., 2011) (referencing the extensive literature on Schmitt's influence on economic, legal, and
political thought); Nicolas Guilhot, American Katechon: When Political Theology Became
International Relations Theory, 17 CONSTELLATIONS 224, 224-53 (June 2010) (discussing the
inception of American international relations theory). But see WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN,
MORGENTHAU: REALISM AND BEYOND 51 (2009) ("In fact, the final chapters of Scientific Man,
where Morgenthau developed a sophisticated political ethics, systematically attacked the view
that politics operates in distinction from morality."); William E. Scheuerman, Was Morgenthau a
Realist?: Revisiting Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 14 CONSTELLATIONS 506, 510 (Dec. 2007)
(stating that Morgenthau attacked Schmitt's ideas because he believed Schmitt had devised a
disturbing model of pure politics where the pursuit of power was unrestrained by even the most
minimal normative chains).
15. I am not counting my own engagement with it. See SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 178 n.3 (2010) ("I adopt the framework of [Koskenniemi's] classics,
while departing very substantially from Koskenniemi's reading of American international law in
the postwar era."). It may not be saying much on either count, but the book's fifth chapter is both
the best researched and most ignored part, so I am taking the liberty of refraining some of its
claims in this essay.
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account of the guild in the early Cold War, I am ultimately interested in why he
left out the all-important events in the decades thereafter. For just as May's
aphorism might lead one to expect, it was not long before American moralism and
formalism returned with a vengeance, especially in and through the commitment of
American international lawyers to universal human rights and "humanity's law."' 6
This perspective, which I will try to spell out in what follows, is not of mere
historical interest. It bears directly on Koskenniemi's confusing and controversial
endorsement of a "culture of formalism" as an alternative to Schmittian realism at
the end of the book.'7 If the American case after World War II ultimately illustrates
not the fall of international law but its rise-and Koskenniemi left out the ending
on which hangs the tale today-then moral norms and formal law could not by
themselves become the salvation of the critical spirit. They would remain the
continuing targets for critical, though not necessarily Schmittian, skepticism.
II. KOSKENNIEMI ON AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL LAW AFTER 1945
After his path-breaking genealogy of international relations out of Schmitt's
criticism of international law, Koskenniemi turns to examine different sectors of
the ongoing discipline. The prior romanticism that fused American moralism with
the esprit d'internationalitg of European vintage in the careers of Elihu Root,
James Brown Scott, and others was now irretrievable, Koskenniemi says.' 8 "Their
idealism-whether in a formalist or natural law version-was completely
discredited after the war."l 9 A few pages later, however, it is clear that it could not
have been completely discredited, for then Morgenthau would have had nothing to
say. Far from always fighting in terms of an honest realism, a "morally loaded
Cold War crusade against communism" prevailed, inviting Morgenthau's contempt
on intellectual grounds, and when it came to the Vietnam War, dissent on political
grounds.20 Morgenthau's priceless wisdom that, during the Cold War, "what the
moral law demanded was by a felicitous coincidence always identical with what
the national interest seemed to require" would have gone without saying, absent
the general persistence of morally-freighted appeals to layered over ones
depending on interest alone.21
One obvious particular site of that persistence was within the precincts of the
guild of international lawyers itself. Koskenniemi is certainly persuasive that the
so-called New Haven school of international law made up of Myres S. McDougal
16. See RUTI G. TEITEL, HUMANITY'S LAW 17 (2011) ("The rise of humanity-centered law
informs a changing conception of global justice that centers on a principle of human security with
formal and substantive dimensions.").
17. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 500-09.
18. Id at 466.
19. Id
20. Id. at 469.
21. Id. (citing HANS MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST: A CRITICAL
EXAMINATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19 (1951)).
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and his coterie provides excellent evidence for his proposition.22 The deformalizing
work of the school's "policy-oriented approach," which drove it into apologetics
for every last bit of America's Cold War agenda, graphically illustrates the
radiance of roughly Schmittian insights and the plausibility of Koskenniemi's
thesis. 23 Yet as Koskenniemi himself registers-without initially incorporating it
into his larger argument-the New Haven school's trademark was not simply to
export legal realism from domestic to international law. 24
Early in the story, in fact, McDougal seems to be Schmitt and his opposite.
For, in a strange conjunction, McDougal also drew value orientation from his own
blatant appeals to naturalistic premises. "In an ironic turn of the tables, the view of
the jurist as legal conscience of the civilized world reappeared," Koskenniemi
himself comments of the school. 25 "McDougal had ... little doubt about the ability
of his moral sensibility to capture people's law in its authenticity." 26 One could add
that McDougal made the concept of "human dignity" central to his
jurisprudence-every bit as central as policy orientation was in the self-conception
of the school-far before anyone else in American international law and when
scholarship on international human rights remained practically non-existent.27 One
might go so far as to say that, within the history of the American profession, what
became the foundational organizing moral principle for humanity's law originated
within this school. Later, Koskenniemi admits that in justification of the American
incursion in the Dominican Republic in 1965, McDougal's relative deformalization
connected not so much with a realist calculus of national interest, but a naive belief
in eternal moral norms that sometimes trumps the irritating formalities of law.28 it
was precisely in the face of this view that Morgenthau, Schmitt's true disciple in
Koskenniemi's account, dissented from America's moralizing representation of its
mission.29
Then there were the Manhattanites, who have an uneasy relationship to
Koskenniemi's narrative. Sometimes they seem external: Koskenniemi opens and
closes his chapter, for example, with an anecdote about Columbia law professor
Wolfgang Friedmann's cri de coeur on behalf of formalism during the Dominican
crisis.30 Yet given that the preeminence of the Manhattanites in the field of
international law within American scholarship has long been plain-even in New
Haven itself-they clearly need to exemplify any story about the fate of American
22. Id. at 474-80.
23. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 480-82.
24. Id. at 475-76.
25. Id. at 476.
26. Id.
27. MOYN, supra note 15, at 195, 301 n.34 (citing Myres S. McDougal, Perspectives for an
International Law of Human Dignity, 53 PROC. OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. 107, 107-36
(1959) (further citations omitted)).
28. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 480-83.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 413-15.
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international law too.3 ' It is not clear that the Manhattanites help Koskenniemi's
argument, especially as the clock ran down on the Cold War era. Though nowhere
near as blatantly naturalistic as their rivals to the north, they maintained their own
sort of faith in the moral role and moral sources of what one of them dubbed the
"invisible college." 32
With the rise of international relations in a Cold War in which international
law played a negligible role, through the 1950s and 1960s, the Manhattanites
played a primarily monitory and defensive role, guarding the flame of moral
conscience and legal formalism in the relentless geopolitical storm of the era.
When Koskenniemi briefly returns to the school later in the chapter, in fact, he
observes that Friedmann and others pursued novel agendas as decolonization
exploded and the interdependence of states came to feature global calls for
development. 34 Indeed, had Oscar Schachter garnered Koskenniemi's attention, he
could have taken this emphasis on Manhattanite creativity much further because,
after Schachter's career in and out of the United Nations, he stood out even against
the background established by his colleagues for his early interest in environmental
degradation and global inequality.3 5
But the combination of defensive formalism and creative experimentation was
not ultimately to define the school in the long run. Perhaps it is because
Koskenniemi's account peters out in the 1960s-before the explosion of human
rights-that he emphasizes deformalization so much to the detriment of
moralization. Even when it came to the Manhattanites, he says, "[t]he one theme
that connected the different strands of U.S. international law scholarship after the
realist challenge was its deformalized conception of law."36 Yet this argument
stands in tension with Koskenniemi's own invocation of the Manhattanite bridling
at McDougalite instrumentalism, during the Dominican crisis and beyond when
Friedmann worried that he could not tell the difference between American policy
and Schmittian Grofiraum. If the thesis of deformalization is plausible relative to
the past, in which Victorian moralism and formalism set the standard, one might
still reply that the Victorians set such a high bar for formalists that no one in any
field of law will ever meet it again. On inspection, American deformalization is
only relative and, in any event, one radically different from the one recommended
by Schmitt (or Morgenthau), for it is one undertaken not against the belief in a
31. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Future of Lou Henkin's Human Rights Movement, 38
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 487, 487 (2007) (reporting that, although never formally a student,
Henkin is one of Koh's three heroes, alongside his father and the Supreme Court justice for whom
he clerked).
32. Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 Nw. U. L. REV.
217, 217 (1977).
33. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 477.
34. Id.
35. See generally OSCAR SCHACHTER, SHARING THE WORLD'S RESOURCES (1977)
(demonstrating how Schachter stood out for his early interest in environmental degradation and
global inequality).
36. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 478-79.
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universal morality but for the sake of it, and often emotionally so.
While the Manhattanites-Friedmann, heroically, aside-largely remained
silent through the Vietnam intervention that McDougal and his minions stooped to
justify, their belief in America's moral mission came into its own soon after.37 In
the long run, after the 1960s, both Friedmann and Schachter were easily outlasted
in significance by Louis Henkin, who provided a massively influential and much
repeated path from American foreign affairs law to international human rights
law.38 It was not that Henkin absolutely refused to exhibit occasional anxiety about
the sort of American exceptionalism that opens the country to accusations of
talking the talk of humanity but walking the walk of the hegemon.39 But ultimately,
the Manhattan school's main significance may not have been to "deformalize"
international law, but to shelter it long enough that its morally uplifting promise
could participate in America's post-Vietnam turn to human rights. Henkin played
the towering role in this regard. From this point on, in the very different
circumstances of the later Cold War, the rise of human rights provided American
international lawyers grounds to believe that power could advance "universal
moralism" through promotion of international law-precisely the myth Schmitt
had attempted to shatter.40
Whereas Friedmann had come to the United States in midlife and kept more
distance on its nationalism before his awful murder in 1972, and whereas
Schachter devoted years to work for the U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration and later to the U.N. hierarchy,41 Henkin began in American
constitutional law and worked for the U.S. Department of State, never showing the
broader interests of his elders. Far more than Friedmann or Schachter, Henkin
attracted large numbers of young American followers, who entered the profession
with his assumptions and often have, like him, done stints down to the present day
in the legal departments of the U.S. government. In the lasting outlook of all those
he influenced-including many of the current most prominent American
professors of international law, sometimes working now more specifically on
international criminal or human rights law-Henkin's school has always preferred
to depend on a profound belief in America's moral significance in world history.
More specifically, Henkin and his followers assume a large zone of overlap
between "American values" as embodied in (their interpretation of) the country's
constitutional tradition and the more global mission of international human rights
law. Their role, as they have seen it, has been to do their best at home-given what
37. In American international law during the Vietnam crisis, it was a renegade
McDougalite, Richard Falk, who stood up to his teacher and associates (and initially the near
totality of the international law profession, Friedmann aside). See SAMUEL MOYN, From Antiwar
Politics to Antitorture Politics, in LAW AND WAR (Austin Sarat et al. eds.) (2013) (discussing the
engagement of U.S. international lawyers in the Vietnam war debate).
38. Lori Fisler Damrosch, In Memoriam: Louis Henkin, 105.2 Am. J. Int'l L. 287, 287-300
(describing the significance of Henkin's career).
39. See id. at 290-91 (describing Henkin's work on arms control).
40. SCHMITr, supra note 8, at 54.
41. He only joined the Columbia law faculty at age sixty. Damrosch, supra note 38, at 289.
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they considered an unbeatable hostility to fuller American participation in
international regimes, hostility to which they have generally, therefore, deferred-
and, after Vietnam, to make sure America stood for its own deepest values
abroad.42 If they have generally idolized America, then it is because it incarnates
moral principles. In short, the evidence of the persistence of an ingrained American
moralism in and through international law is simply too great to brush aside-and,
if the evidence mounted further after Koskenniemi's account prematurely closes in
the middle of the Cold War years, it became entirely undeniable around the end of
the Cold War and in our time.
III. LIBERALISM, INTERNATIONALISM, LEGALISM
I thus wonder if it could possibly be accurate to contend, as Koskenniemi
does, that "[a]fter the Second World War, American international lawyers largely
gave up the 'utopian' hopes of their inter-war predecessors."43 If they incorporated
realism, it was in the service of a new project in which it was subordinate to a
progressive morality that they sometimes found-like their Victorian
predecessors-to be the implicit code for international law, even if they also knew
that morality and law sometimes regrettably diverged.4 Although American
nationalism, with its inveterate moralizing, occasionally trumped the esprit
d'internationalitd, it nevertheless compelled only a modest and episodic farewell
to the formalist premise that the law can and should govern men. After all,
according to Henkin's immortal slogan, "almost all nations observe almost all
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the
time"-and the United States could not count as an exception to this
generalization. 45
In the ten years after Koskenniemi's account closes, American international
law underwent a massive transformation. It was one that, equally as much as or
more than its Cold War realist inflection, set the stage for its post-Cold War role. I
refer, of course, to the sudden and eventually massive turn to international human
rights law, non-existent or somnolent before, not least in the career of Henkin
himself.46 Omitting this seemingly massive and significant development, without
which there is no judgment possible of the trajectory of American-or, of course,
global-international law, Koskenniemi instead does something different. 47 In the
service of his argument about realist deformalization, he leaves history to turn to
42. Id. at 295-96 (detailing Henkin's approach to human rights law).
43. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 482 (coming later
in the chapter and describing the era as a whole).
44. Id.
45. LOuis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979)
(emphasis added). It is rarely noticed that Henkin began this sentence, "[i]t is probably the case
that...."
46. Moyn, supra note 15, 201-07.
47. In fact, I am grateful for this omission since it provided the impulse for my own minor
attempt to remedy it, focusing on Henkin's career, in MOYN, supra note 15, ch. 5.
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the revealing career of Anne-Marie Slaughter, straddling the end of the Cold War,
and especially the project to amalgamate international law and international
relations on which she embarked.48
On its face, Slaughter's early scholarship seems especially powerful evidence
for Koskenniemi's proposal. The official intellectual enterprise that would
establish her reputation did indeed open the era of new proximity between
international law and international relations-two approaches that, whatever the
realist turn of international law itself after World War II had for various reasons
failed to converge. 49 "This is an American crusade," Koskenniemi observes in a
revealing turn of phrase, continuing to a withering verdict on it.50
By this, I do not mean . . . that nearly all of the relevant literature comes
from North America . . .. [T]he interdisciplinary agenda itself, together
with a deformalized concept of law, and enthusiasm about the spread of
'liberalism,' constitutes an academic project that cannot but buttress the
justification of American empire, as both Schmitt and McDougal well
understood.51
If this occurred, however, it seems much more a matter of McDougal's
subordination of realist calculus to moral certainty of America's universal mission,
which Schmitt is so helpful in unmasking, than of Schmitt's own hope for a
deformalized international law with no universalistic pretense. Koskenniemi, while
continuing to voice his anxiety about deformalization, eventually turns to an
unmasking of this "American crusade" as a smokescreen for national might that is
much more focused on its self-romanticizing moralism than on its realist
antiformalism.52
Koskenniemi knows, after all, that Slaughter and other liberals have built their
careers and staked their reputations on providing an alternative to realism for the
sake of a moralized and legalized conception of the uses of power in world
affairs.53 More specifically, she sprang from a self-styled current of "liberal
internationalism"-a phrase that exploded only in the 1980s, at first as an internal
development within international relations. 54 This idealist-though, in its own self-
48. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 483-89.
49. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations
Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 206-07 (1993) (describing the separate
development of international law and international relations as a response to the "Realist
Challenge"); see also JEFFREY L. DUNOFF & MARK A. POLLACK, INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE
ART 613 (2013) (describing Slaughter Burley's work "as one of the 'canonical' calls for
interdisciplinary scholarship"); William Burke-White, International Law and International
Relations Theory: The First Twenty Years and Beyond (forthcoming) (discussing how
international law and international relations began to converge following Slaughter's call).
50. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 483.
51. Id. at 483-84.
52. Id. at 489-94.
53. Id. at 483-89 (describing how some liberals have striven to provide alternatives to
realism).
54. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Liberal International Relations Theory and
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description, non-utopian-school incorporated international law as a central
feature of its approach because it provided both a moral impulse and a theory of
multilateral "consent" to a body of thought that had previously marginalized
normative content and left no room for legal formality. 5 Having corrected realism
in the acid bath of the Vietnam aftermath, American liberal internationalism saw
itself unopposed by any serious ideological alternatives, though the thorny problem
of precisely how to bring liberal market democracy to the world remained and
many specific debates about its implications lay ahead-the problem of
humanitarian intervention, for one. Since its post-Vietnam invention, a liberal
internationalism summoning Immanuel Kant for the sake of scrubbing Woodrow
Wilson's original legacy clean has never been uncontroversial.
But my point is historical; beyond question, the crystallization of liberal
internationalism in the era straddling the end of the Cold War allowed for a
moralistic surge-and centrality of international law-simply without precedent in
America's postwar public life, whether in American politics generally or legal
circles specifically. 56 It remains the crucial development for understanding
American international law today and the mission of American international
lawyers in the academy-and, when Democrats win, the administration-both to
civilize and deploy power through an ultimately moral law.57 No wonder that on
Koskenniemi's own account, this renaissance of liberal international law-
whatever its continuing accommodation of deformalization for the sake of
explaining real outcomes and exercising power-sounds "hardly different from the
naturalism of the inter-war lawyers or the arguments from the civilized
conscience-consciousness of the men of 1873."' It is not a break from gentle
International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717, 727-31 (1995) (explaining that
"liberal internationalism" is the most popular form of "liberalism" and comparing and contrasting
liberalism with realism and institutionalism); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Law Among Liberal
States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1907, 1914-
23 (1992) (offering a history of "liberal internationalism" from Kantian principles to the modem
era and examining its role in transnational relations).
55. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, supra note 49, at 226-38. The history of international
relations theory in the United States, now a cottage industry when it comes to the immediate post-
World War II years, remains to be written for the era thereafter, notably the age in which Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye dominated and successors emphasizing liberalism like Michael Doyle,
John Ikenberry, Andrew Moravcsik, Beth Simmons, etc. rose. This is the age in which "liberal
internationalism" came about.
56. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Revolution of the Spirit, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS J. 1, 1-
11 (1990) (describing the moralistic surge in international law after the Cold War); Anne-Marie
Slaughter Burley, Toward an Age of Liberal Nations, 33 HARv. INT'L L.J. 33, 393-405 (1992)
(defending liberal internationalism).
57. In a recent book recounting how Great Britain used international law to free slaves, one
scholar concludes: "At a moment when U.S. military and economic power is at a peak ... the
United States should consider projecting that power into the future by creating and supporting
stable international legal institutions rather than fostering a world order based on power alone."
JENNY S. MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 171 (2012).
58. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 489.
408 [27.2
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT Is AMERICA
civilizing; in the self-conception of liberal internationalism, it is that very project.
Deeply non-Schmittian in its fervent moralism though liberal internationalism
is, Koskenniemi explains its compatibility with Schmitt's intervening revolution in
two ways. 59 One is that morality is just a smokescreen for the key school of
Democratic Party foreign policy after the Vietnam crisis, masking a narrow and
brutal commitment of American imperial dominion. 60 The other is that, unlike the
Victorian crusading, which justified faith in rules, this new moralism is post-
formalist, profoundly dependent on the prior criticism of formalism:
Once the critique of formalism has freed the lawyer from the constraint
of rules . . . the lawyer is encouraged to begin a quest for the fabled
moral norms that dictate what are rational choices for everyone, in other
words, to re-imagine the law's job as having to do with the resolution of
the 3,000-year old enigma about objective morality.61
In this story, although Schmitt stands as a critic of moralizing, he also
inadvertently enabled a more dissimulating kind than ever before, perhaps
precisely because it has found a way to avoid professed self-subjugation to the rule
of law when push comes to shove. The argument is powerful, yet ultimately
American liberal internationalism bears too close a resemblance to the very
professional hopes that The Gentle Civilizer of Nations chronicles to allow even
this sophisticated version of Schmittian conquest to make much sense. If so, it may
be the moralism, not the post-formalism, of American international law that
remains the main historical and political problem.
To review The Idea That Is America, Slaughter's call in 2007 to Americans to
keep faith with their values, is to make it rather difficult to credit the premise of a
cynically instrumental moralism-there is simply too much moralism in it to do
so.62 Slaughter transports the reader into the poignant-for some, cloying-
ambiance of a true believer in a unique power on earth, founded on and standing
for universal moral norms. 63 After 9/11-induced error, Slaughter says, Americans
are called upon once again to rediscover their birthright of moral principles that,
after informing the creation of the country and then the global order of post-World
War II international law, now risks being forsaken for the pottage of
counterterrorist expediency.64 Slaughter reports:
America has never fully accepted the traditional game of the
international system. From George Washington to Woodrow Wilson to
Ronald Reagan, we have claimed to stand apart from old-world power
politics and stand for our values instead. Seeking power as an end in
itself-even to balance the power of other states-seems, well, un-
59. Id. at 490.
60. Id. at 491.
61. Id. at 493-94.
62. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, THE IDEA THAT IS AMERICA: KEEPING FAITH WITH OUR
VALUES IN A DANGEROUS WORLD, at xi (2007).
63. Id.
64. Id. at xi-xiii.
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American.65
Further, Slaughter goes on to assert, "America is a place, a country, a people, but
also an idea. It is the idea of a nation founded on a set of universal values-self-
evident truths-that come not from blood, or soil, or skin color, or wealth-but
from the fact of our common humanity." 66 She makes her own the magnificent
affirmation of Jimmy Carter's farewell address: "America did not invent human
rights. In a very real sense, . . . [h]uman rights invented America." As such, deep
down, America simply incarnates morality, except when mistakenly led astray; for
this reason, even if America's moral course-banning torture, for example-
happens also to be in its national interest, it is critical first of all because of "who
we are."68 In turn, the idea that is America "ultimately belongs to all the world's
peoples .... [P]art of what we think makes us distinctively American is that we
hold to a set of values that apply around the world."6 9 And so on.
It is also rather difficult to credit the premise of a purely situational moralism
trumped when the need requires by great power exigencies. After all, the entire
point of Slaughter's book, as it was for the post-Vietnam birth of contemporary
liberal internationalism in the first place, is to "reclaim American virtue."70
Slaughter encodes a memory of that recent origin. From the nadir of burning
children with napalm to the triumph of walls falling down, America's recovery to
global moral leadership was nothing short of extraordinary-so much so that the
post-9/11 reversion to Cold War realism is more outrageous still.7 Put differently,
Slaughter's central goal is to provide a riposte to the most recent era of "realist"
neglect of, or offense to, international law. "I want to be able to hold my head high
again," Slaughter explains, "from common moral and political purpose with the
vast majority of humankind." 72 Accordingly, the charge of American lawlessness
has a special sting. Slaughter's is "a country that accepts constraints in order to be
able to constrain others, as the essence of the rule of law."73 It thus seems difficult
to claim that liberal internationalism "denies the value of the formal as such,"
which is Koskenniemi's marker beyond which Schmittian realism rules.74 Though
65. Id. at xii.
66. Id. at 1.
67. Id. at 9 (citing Jimmy Carter, President of the United States, Farewell Address (Jan. 14,
1981)).
68. SLAUGHTER, supra note 62, at 138. In a recent reflection on the relevance of her earlier
academic work once she entered government service under Barack Obama as director of policy
planning, Slaughter cites the president's frequent usage of the phrase "who we are" as evidence
that he rejected realism, for example in abandoning autocrats during the so-called Arab spring.
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: Twenty Years
Later, in DUNOFF & POLLACK, supra note 49, at 618.
69. SLAUGHTER, supra note 62, at 215, 224.
70. BARBARA J. KEYS, RECLAIMING AMERICAN VIRTUE: THE HUMAN RIGHTS
REVOLUTION OF THE 1970s (2014).
71. SLAUGHTER, supra note 62, at x-xi.
72. Id. at xvi.
73. Id. at xviii.
74. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 501.
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the fashionable anti-Americanism of intellectuals wearing black will never relent,
Slaughter concludes, the groundswell of understandable anti-Americanism
unleashed by George W. Bush's recklessness is serious and prompts a return to
basics." "Patriotic Americans need to understand these critiques and take them to
heart if we want our country to be true to its mission."76 Slaughter may be deluded,
but the priority and continuity in her thought of the selfsame universal moralism
that has informed American international law from the beginning seems hard to
deny.
IV. THE USES OF ANTIFORMALISM IN THE AGE OF THE MORAL LAW
Koskenniemi's account of American international law after World War II is
as thought-provoking as the proposal to which it leads him of a renewed "culture
of formalism" is compelling. Most distressingly, however, a narrative in which
Schmitt and his devious henchmen bring antiformalism to American international
law leaves out the rather important fact that antiformalism in American
international law produced Koskenniemi himself. The last chapter of The Gentle
Civilizer of Nations should be read not solely or so much as history; it is a history
produced by, rather than leading to, the surprising proposal for progressive
jurisprudence to reincorporate some modicum of formalism it had just spent
decades attacking, or "trashing," in the vocabulary of the critical legal studies
movement that sponsored the attack. Right or wrong as a matter of legal theory,
the trouble is that the history supposed to motivate this proposal obscures too much
to be persuasive. It omits not simply the enduring American faith in international
law's moral credentials, but also the powerful surge of leftist antiformalism in
American international law-including Koskenniemi's own intellectual origins.79
It seems a failure of self-reference for a story about post-World War II American
international law, especially one focused on antiformalism, to omit the very
antiformalistic conditions that led to the story in the first place.
For Schmitt was never the sole realist in Western intellectual history or in
legal theory. A contemporary renaissance of realism proceeds from the crucial
premise that insight into the historicity of norms and into the politics of forms
comes in multiple varieties. Niccol6 Machiavelli's children certainly include
conservatives-and even fascists-like Meinecke and Schmitt, but the contentious
family also comprises liberals like Judith Shklar and Bernard Williams as well as
leftists from Karl Marx to those contemporaries valiantly bridling against the
75. SLAUGHTER, supra note 62, at xvi.
76. Id at xvi.
77. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 494-502.
78. Id. at 413-509.
79. That Koskenniemi, in spite of his European origins and influences, was profoundly
shaped by American critical legal studies-and in particular David Kennedy's export of Duncan
Kennedy's structuralist version of it to international law-is sufficiently obvious and
uncontroversial that no defense of it is needed here. It will nevertheless someday form a crucial
chapter of a much needed history of critical legal studies that remains to be written.
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hegemony of liberalism in moral philosophy. At the present time, to be sure,
realism is spiking in the moral and political philosophy that international legal
theory seems perpetually to trail, but then the history of jurisprudence has its own
rich plural traditions of realism to revive and extend at any point.80
It is not surprising, therefore, that Koskenniemi's own moral call for a
"culture of formalism" has been the single most controversial feature of his book-
and perhaps understandably given the implausibility of presenting formalism as the
sole alternative to Schmittian realism.8' And it is not as if Koskenniemi's
formalism is unreconstructed anyway. Rather, like that of the Americans he
indicts, it is path-dependent, presuming the Cold War experience that he worries
led to an especially dangerous return to ethics and rules. "Whatever virtue a culture
of formalism might have," Koskenniemi acknowledges, "must be seen in historical
terms."82 What makes formalism a sophisticated professional option to ponder,
rather than a naive article of faith to presume, is that it is a politically inspired
recommendation at a moment when deformalization suddenly seems not to serve
the left very well. "The way back to a . .. formalism sans peur et sans reproche is
no longer open," Koskenniemi rightly says.83 "The critique of rules and principles
cannot be undone." 84 But then, the embrace of legal formality by Koskenniemi's
80. RAYMOND GEUSS, PHILOSOPHY AND REAL POLITICS 23-95 (2008); BERNARD
WILLIAMS, IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE DEED: REALISM AND MORALISM IN POLITICAL
ARGUMENT 1- 17 (2005). See William Galston, Realism in Political Theory, in 9(4) EUROPEAN
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL THEORY 385, 385-41 1(Oct. 2010) (evaluating the increased turn towards
realism in the works of scholars of political and philosophical thought and comparing it to
idealism); see also POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY VERSUS HISTORY? CONTEXTUALISM AND REAL
POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT 106-07 (Jonathan Floyd & Marc Stears, eds.,
2011) (offering a series of realist proposals); Bonnie Honig & Marc Stears, The New Realism, in
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY VERSUS HISTORY? CONTEXTUALISM AND REAL POLITICS IN
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra at 177-205 (analyzing the works of Raymond
Geuss and Bernard Williams on realism). For Judith Shklar as a realist, see Katrina Forrester,
Judith Shklar, Bernard Williams, and Political Realism, 11(3) EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
POLITICAL THEORY 247, 248 (July 2012) (evaluating the particular bent of Judith Shklar's realist
thought, "'the liberalism of fear,"' and comparing it with that of John Rawls and Bernard
Williams); Andrew Sabl, History and Reality: Idealist Pathologies and "Harvard School"
Remedies, in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY VERSUS HISTORY? CONTEXTUALISM AND REAL POLITICS
IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra at 151-76 (analyzing the Harvard school of
political realism and justifying its reliance on history); Samuel Moyn, Judith Shklar versus the
International Criminal Court, 4(3) HUMANITY 473 (Fall 2013) (examining the consequences of
Shklar's realism for thinking about current international criminal law).
81. See KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 494-509;
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ARGUMENT 564-617 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (1989) [hereinafter KOSKENNIEMI,
FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA]. But see, e.g., Paavo Kotiaho, A Return to Koskenniemi, or the
Disconcerting Co-optation of Rupture, 13 FINNISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 483,
485 (forthcoming) (criticizing these works of Koskenniemi and analyzing whether they are
merely wishful thinking).
82. KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, supra note 81, at 616.
83. KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 495.
84. Id. at 495-96.
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own lights could only follow from a post-formalist and situational ethics.
The unavoidable conclusion is that everybody claims the universal in a war
over its true representation, no less Koskenniemi than American liberals. They
differ not in the room they make for norms or forms, but in the content of the
former and in the deployment of the latter. If a "non-imperialist universality" is the
highest aspiration of the critical international lawyer, then there is no way to avoid
acknowledging that the heartfelt orientation to the selfsame polestar guides
American liberals to the core. (Slaughter entitles the conclusion to her book "Stars
to Steer By," referring to bedrock universal values). If a culture of formalism is
ultimately a post-formalist tool to rein in America, then it is also one which liberal
internationalists see as a post-formalist tool to rein in Republicans and advance
universal morality.
Turning to Koskenniemi's honest and moving struggle over the politics of
humanity in his always sparkling essays-which register the significance and
ambiguity of the very body of law his history of the field omits by ending too
early-we can see the dilemma in which the universal is simultaneously utopian
lure and dangerous ideology. If there is one consistent theme in Koskenniemi's
approach to human rights in particular, it is the need to keep them distant from
politics and law in order to safeguard their critical potential against standing
powers. In his first, surprisingly late, main article on the subject, Koskenniemi
argued that their essential value is before they are politicized as part of ordinary
governmental and legal processes, after which their fictional absolutism too easily
becomes one more move in the game of the powerful.86 More recently,
Koskenniemi bravely insists on the need to keep "utopian" human rights outside
the mainstream of governance to shelter them from instrumentalization.17 But the
response to this sort of claim has to be unforgiving. If that was ever a plausible
option, it is way too late-not least considering the centrality of human rights to
American liberal internationalism, not to mention European governance, for
decades now.
85. See KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 506;
SLAUGHTER, supra note 62, at 215-33. But cf Samuel Moyn, Soft Sells: On Liberal
Internationalism, THE NATION, Oct. 3, 2011, at 40; SAMUEL MOYN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
USES OF HISTORY (forthcoming 2014).
86. Martti Koskenniemi, The Effect of Rights on Political Culture, in THE EU AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 99, 99 (Philip Alston ed. 1999) ("[O]nce rights become institutionalized as a central part
of political and administrative culture, they lose their transformative effect and are petrified into a
legalistic paradigm that marginalizes values or interests . . . ."), reprinted in MARTTI
KOSKENNIEMI, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133-152 (2011); see also Martti
Koskenniemi, The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT 27, 36
(Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjorn Eide eds. 1999) ("[I]n most situations of social regulation,
different groups and individuals are able to invoke rights that are formally equal but nevertheless
imply different policies.").
87. See Martti Koskenniemi, Human Rights Mainstreaming as a Strategy of Institutional
Power, 1(1) HUMANITY, 47, 47-58 (2010) (arguing that certain human rights will be
instrumentalized if brought within the mainstream of governance).
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But while Koskenniemi is rarely willing to implicate human rights in the
syndrome, he is also an exceptionally effective critic of the "turn to ethics" and the
"new natural law" that post-1989 global politics have made prominent-and surely
not in American liberal internationalism alone. Nor is Koskenniemi's skepticism
solely focused on the huge ascent-notwithstanding The Gentle Civilizer of
Nations' attack-of the proposal to connect international law and international
relations, whose liberal and conservative versions he tends to blend together.89
Instead, it indicts a much broader moralistic tendency, as if American moralism-
whatever its exact relation to formalism-has gone global in the ascent of romantic
pictures of the salvation of international law provides in a post-ideological world.
In fact, these days it seems as if Schmitt is now a powerful resource in
Koskenniemi's own critical arsenal when it comes to the common view that
universal morality is what existing international law advances. In his recent book
review of Ruti Teitel's important Humanity 's Law, which celebrates remarkable
strides towards a truly universalistic international law that is based on human
rights, Koskenniemi is extremely cutting about the ideology of the universal. 90 "In
the last years of the twentieth century, at least partly as a result of the end of the
Cold War, the language of universal humanity spread throughout diplomacy and
international institutions," Koskenniemi observes.91 Yet Koskenniemi states:
[t]he cost of this has been the abstraction of political discourse, which
has made invisible the reality of political choices: the way some will
win, others lose. The language of the universal also tends to lift the
speaker's values to an altogether exalted position-as the position of
"humanity"-suggesting that the political game was over before it even
began .... Reading acts or statements by international institutions as
automatically representative of humanity law overlooks the routine of
hegemonic politics that leads to their adoption.92
It does not sound as if Koskenniemi-who even goes on to cite the German's
famous maxim about the duplicity of those who parade under the banner of
humanity-thinks Schmitt's uses are altogether exhausted in the age of human
rights. 93
88. See Martti Koskenniemi, 'The Lady Doth Protest Too Much': Kosovo, and the Turn to
Ethics in International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159, 159-75 (2002).
89. See Martti Koskenniemi, Law, Teleology and International Relations: An Essay in
Counterdisciplinarity, 26 INT'L REL. 3, 3-34 (2012) (arguing that international law is not a
substitute for political thought, but rather a practice of argumentation through which political
claims can be attacked or defended).
90. Martti Koskenniemi, Humanity's Law by Ruti G. Teitel, 26 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 395,
396-97 (2012) (book review) (contending that the spread of the language of universal humanity
throughout diplomacy and international institutions has come with numerous costs affecting
political choices, and also promotes giving the illusion that statements by international
institutions reflect humanity law without revealing the politics that led to the adoption of those
statements).
91. Id. at 395.
92. Id. at 395-96.
93. Id at 397.
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V. CONCLUSION
Since the end of the Cold War, international law has played an extraordinary
role in and about the United States in political debates-sometimes, famously, for
the sake of "rationalizing the unthinkable"-but mostly as a continuing normative
standard that matters as figures from presidents to professors meditate on the
acceptable constraints on America's continuing global engagement, which few
oppose in itself.94 In this sense, international law rose in and through the years
straddling the end of the Cold War to such a remarkable public presence that, in
itself, occasional nostalgia one sometimes hears for its role long ago-and perhaps
even in the closing wistfulness of Koskenniemi's book-fails to be plausible. I
therefore side with the Koskenniemi who, moving beyond pining for a lost age of
internationalism, interrogates the unprecedented role of universalist law for its
ideological and governmental functions, while also looking to save the universal
from its current embroilments.
Henry May argued that it was just prior to World War I that a few American
elites, absorbing European modernism, lost their innocence, including their
innocence about the eternity and certainty of moral norms. But this insight never
got that far, for unsophisticated moralism seems ever present. It is also probably
right that the call to "end our innocence" is likewise old-the trope was central, as
Jason Stevens has recently shown, to Cold War arguments about the tragic limits
of moralism.96 From another perspective, the history of the American field
illustrates the tenacity of the belief that liberal international law will somehow and
someday hew out an alternative to sinful power rather than remain an ideology of
it. As long as this remains true, then realism and deformalization-if not in
Schmitt's rendition then some other-are still relevant. Koskenniemi's writing
shows as much.
Yet it would be wrong to end this essay with any sort of critical sentiment.
For historians like myself, Koskenniemi's The Gentle Civilizer of Nations
transformed several fields, inaugurating a continuing golden age of interest in the
history of international law. Thanks to his methodological turn to the study of
lawyers, as well as his masterful and unsurpassed account of their peregrinations,
what had been a moribund area of scholarship has become among the most
exciting-an achievement due entirely to his vision. And if any parts of that
history demand interrogation, then it is only in the spirit that Koskenniemi has
enacted, and for the sake of a better future he has evoked.
94. See generally DAVID COLE, THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE
UNTHINKABLE (2009).
95. See MAY, supra note 1, at 333-54 (discussing political and cultural changes that took
place shortly prior to World War I as well as the American leaders associated with those
changes).
96. JASON W. STEVENS, GOD-FEARING AND FREE: A SPIRITUAL HISTORY OF AMERICA'S
COLD WAR 299-310 (2010).
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